IIROC fines on individuals- Are they a deterrent?
The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
(IIROC) has argued that their inability to collect fines from individuals
reduces their credibility as a regulator. Their position: “If you break the rules and abuse
the trust your clients have placed in you, you must pay the penalty and be seen
to pay it." In Alberta , Quebec and PEI, IIROC can apply to courts to
certify its decisions and fines, which gives the organization court approval to
enforce fines .As a result, they seek authority from other provinces and
Ontario is next to provide that authority .
Loss of registration and public shaming can be effective deterrents for individuals .We don’t think better collection of fines from
individuals will enhance deterrence or improve investor protection at all. Even provincial Securities
Commissions with the necessary authority aren’t very good collectors. For
example, the British Columbia Securities Commission has collected less than 5%
of monetary sanctions imposed since its incorporation in 1995. Individuals tend
to declare bankruptcy, have few assets to seize or relocate to another
province. In 2016, IIROC collected just 8.3% of fines against individuals.
IIROC would collect the fines if it made the dealer responsible for the fines of
its individual reps. This would lead to the dealer caring about its individual
reps receiving any fines and would therefore improve compliance and deterrence
of wrongdoing in the first place.
The hard facts of the matter are that the vast majority
of root causes for rule breaches can be traced back to the dealer: these
include poor advisor recruitment and training, advice - skewing
incentives/inducements for advisors, deficient KYC / risk profiling tools, weak
supervision, ineffective administrative controls, poor compliance processes all
in a culture of greed. In some cases, branch managers and supervision are
compensated for branch sales putting their supervisory roles in a conflict-of
interest. The result is that the person at the bottom of the pyramid takes the
fall, the individual advisor.
Let's take a closer look at exactly how IIROC operates.
First off is its board is decidedly stacked with industry oriented Directors. The
Small Investor Protection Association has issued a report on IIROC governance
and found that industry participation on the board is strong while investor
representation is weak. It does not have an Investor Advisory committee and its
engagement with retail investors is not considered strong. The vast majority of
the fines it levies are against individuals rather than its fee-paying Member dealers.
IIROC rarely obtains restitution for victims of financial assault by its Member
firms. Fines collected go into a restricted fund - they cannot be used for
investor restitution but can be used to subsidize certain IIROC operations including
Hearing Panels and market participant/investor education. When IIROC collects
money from disgorgement it retains the cash instead of returning it to harmed
investors.
Are the fines a deterrent? We think not since fines are generally a fraction of what the investor lost .On a statistical basis the number of complaint cases in the industry seems to be stable perhaps even increasing. Suitability continues to be the major issue year after year.
Not only is effectiveness and deterrence value questionable there is actually a potential downside. Giving IIROC collection authority will divert scarce human resources from investigating dealers to fighting court battles. It will also require added legal expenses. Although IIROC will cherry pick its cases there is still the chance it will lose a case and that could have a negative impact on the SRO.
We'd rather see IIROC focus its limited resources on preventing investor abuse by 1.(a) changing its rules for suitability, dealing rep compensation and complaint handling; (b) establishing more cooperative agreements with insurance and banking regulators and most importantly (c) step up its enforcement of dealers and 2. Holding dealers accountable when they reject an OBSI restitution recommendation. That would put money in the pockets of the investor rather than the SRO.
Are the fines a deterrent? We think not since fines are generally a fraction of what the investor lost .On a statistical basis the number of complaint cases in the industry seems to be stable perhaps even increasing. Suitability continues to be the major issue year after year.
Not only is effectiveness and deterrence value questionable there is actually a potential downside. Giving IIROC collection authority will divert scarce human resources from investigating dealers to fighting court battles. It will also require added legal expenses. Although IIROC will cherry pick its cases there is still the chance it will lose a case and that could have a negative impact on the SRO.
We'd rather see IIROC focus its limited resources on preventing investor abuse by 1.(a) changing its rules for suitability, dealing rep compensation and complaint handling; (b) establishing more cooperative agreements with insurance and banking regulators and most importantly (c) step up its enforcement of dealers and 2. Holding dealers accountable when they reject an OBSI restitution recommendation. That would put money in the pockets of the investor rather than the SRO.
The
financial services industry will not reform because the current deflection
strategy works well. Instead of assuming responsibility, the industry is able
to deflect all attention to the miscreant dealing reps. Periodically, to
appease the protests of the public and media, a rep is hung in full public view
to "demonstrate" the "concerns" of the industry but these
instances are nothing more than show trials. This situation will only change
when the buck stops at the dealer. Only when the dealers are held liable for
the transgressions of their employees/representatives will the situation change
and not a second before.